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Abstract While some branches of complexity theory are advancing rapidly, the
same cannot be said for our understanding of emergence. Despite a complete
knowledge of the rules underlying the interactions between the parts of many
systems, we are often bafﬂed by their sudden transitions from simple to complex.
Here I propose a solution to this conceptual problem. Given that emergence is often
the result of many interactions occurring simultaneously in time and space, an
ability to intuitively grasp it would require the ability to consciously think in par-
allel. A simple exercise is used to demonstrate that we do not possess this ability.
Our surprise at the behaviour of cellular automata models, and the natural cases of
pattern formation they mimic, is then explained from this perspective. This work
suggests that the cognitive limitations of the mind can be as signiﬁcant a barrier to
scientiﬁc progress as the limitations of our senses.
Keywords Emergence  Complexity theory  Pattern formation 
Cellular automata  Parallel processing
Introduction
Thestudyofcomplexsystemsisoneofthefewareaswherephysicalandlifescientists
share a common focus of study. If for no other reason, this makes it an intriguing
subject. When the same principles can be used to model ecological communities,
patterns of animal coat coloration, and the complex dynamics of chemical and
physical systems one can only conclude that deep principles are being explored
(Prigogine 1980; Nicolis and Prigogine 1989; Bonabeau et al. 1997; Camazine et al.
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DOI 10.1007/s10539-010-9230-62001; Vicsek 2002; Coveney 2003). While great progress has been made in
understanding some branches of complexity theory, such as self-organization, the
same cannot be said of our understanding of the concept of emergence (Crutchﬁeld
1994; Corning 2002).
There seem to be three basic approaches to deﬁning and exploring emergent
properties. One approach seeks to deﬁne the concept using informal logic. These
researchers focus on the general scope of reductionism (reviewed in Newth and
Finnigan 2006 and Halley and Winkler 2006). A consensus view might be that
complex systems are irreducible and emergence occurs when a whole is more than
the sum of its parts and their interactions. A second approach essentially deﬁnes
emergence by showing that it is the result of a particular process such as symmetry
breaking (Anderson 1972) or self-organization (Turing 1952; Prigogine 1980;
Nicolis and Prigogine 1989; Camazine et al. 2001). This approach has had the
greatest success, in that we now understand some of the dynamics of systems that
show emergence. The third approach seeks to provide an explicit set of
mathematical equations for quantifying the degree of complexity in any system
such that a comparison of the amount of information in the parts can be compared to
that in the whole (Crutchﬁeld and Young 1989; Nehaniv and Rhodes 2000; Adami
2002; Bar-Yam 2004). These studies attempt to predict when complex phenomena
will result from interacting units with varying degrees of information.
While all of these approaches are valuable for addressing different aspects of
emergence, they fail to give us a satisfying explanation for the aspect of it that
inspires the most curiosity and confusion. I am referring to those situations where
we possess a complete knowledge of the simple rules governing the behaviour of a
number of interactants and, nevertheless, our intuition is still bafﬂed by the sudden
onset of pattern from disorder. This form of emergence generates much of the
interest in the topic, as it inspires fascination and a promise of major advances for
some, while its mysterious nature is a source of frustration for others.
In this paper, I will argue for a new conceptual way to view emergent properties
that eliminates their mysterious nature. The primary goal is to address the surprise
that emergent phenomena evoke. I will argue that emergence is surprising and
unpredictable because many interactions occurring simultaneously in space and
time are the basis for rapid transitions between order and disorder. Further, the fact
that we cannot consciously think in parallel explains our bewilderment when
pondering the outcome of such processes.
Parallel conscious thinking?
The following argument requires that the reader participate in a simple exercise.
Carefully attempt the tasks in Fig. 1. There is nothing complex here. You are asked
to add together lists of ones and zeros. Moreover, since the zeros do not count,
adding is not even necessary. All that is required is to count the ones as you scan
across the line. People vary in the rate at which they can accomplish this, as they do
for most mental exercises. What happens, however, when one attempts to count
more than one row simultaneously? Although we can do two, it is only by adding
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the second line and doing the same and then iterating back and forth that we can do
so. Counting two rows in parallel is equivalent to reading two sentences at once.
This is functionally impossible for us. Personally, I cannot even begin the task of
simultaneously counting ﬁve rows. I do not know the physiological reason, of
course, but my mind (and the mind of everyone I have asked to attempt this task)
seems to have no capacity for it whatsoever. It may, thus, be a hardware problem
and not simply a problem with how we are taught to add and subtract numbers.
Consider the relationship between the tasks of adding one row of numbers and
adding two rows simultaneously. I chose lines of ones and zeros to make the point
that the difﬁculty of the ﬁrst task has nothing to do with our inability to do the
second. We perform many tasks in sequence that are much more difﬁcult than the
adding of two rows of numbers in parallel. Further, our visual system is capable of
just this sort of parallel processing (otherwise we could not see over a sufﬁcient area
in time so as be surprised by the rapidity of pattern formation in nature). The brain is
in fact capable of parallel processing in many contexts (Balleine and Killcross 2006;
Dieck and Brandstatter 2006; Spehr et al. 2006). We simply may not have evolved
the ability to consciously think in parallel because it is unnecessary in our daily
lives.
Multiple simultaneous interactions
Multiple simultaneous interactions are those in which each interactant is responsive
to more than one other at each moment in time. Imagine an orderly front of
1. 1+0+1+0+0+1+1+1+0+1+1+1+1+0+1+0+0+0+1+0+1+0+0+0+1 = _________,   _________. 
2. 1+0+0+1+0+0+1+1+0+1+0+0+1+0+1+1+0+1+1+0+0+1+1+1+0 = _________,   _________. 
0+1+1+0+1+0+0+1+0+1+0+1+0+0+1+0+1+0+1+0+1+0+1+1+1 = _________.    
    Total            Time 
    Total            Time 
    Total            Time 
3. 0+1+1+0+1+0+0+1+1+1+0+0+0+0+1+0+1+0+0+1+1+0+1+1+1 = _________,   _________. 
1+0+1+0+1+0+0+1+0+1+0+1+1+0+1+0+1+0+1+0+1+0+1+1+1 = _________.    
0+0+1+1+1+0+1+1+0+0+1+1+0+0+0+1+0+1+1+0+0+1+1+0+0 = _________.    
0+1+0+1+1+1+0+0+1+1+0+0+1+1+1+0+1+1+0+1+1+0+1+1+0 = _________.    
1+0+0+1+0+0+1+1+0+1+1+0+1+0+1+1+0+0+0+1+1+0+0+1+1 = _________.    
Fig. 1 A simple exercise designed to test your ability to consciously think in parallel. Add the numbers
in part 1 carefully and record the time in takes. Now try to do the same for part 2 by scanning across both
lines at the same time and adding in parallel. An ability to add in parallel would allow you to complete
part 2 in the same time it took you to complete part 1. Now try part 3. The reader is encouraged to invent
other such games and test themselves in other contexts. Our inability to add more than one line at a time
has nothing to do with our ability to see both lines. It is clearly cognitive
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move forward in tandem. The suggestion that this type of interaction leads to
emergence is fundamentally different from noting that we are often overwhelmed
with enormous amounts of information. Gas particles, for example, exist in vast
quantities, and interact millions of times within a very short time span. Of course,
with respect to the movement of one molecule, we cannot follow such a long causal
trajectory. This is independent of the phenomenon of which I am speaking,
however. When interactions are multiple and simultaneous, they need not be many
to overwhelm our cognitive ability. Figure 1 makes this point in one context and I
could propose many others. I will not labour the point here, however, since I will
explain a well known case of this phenomenon in the next section. It is important
here to grasp that in nature, and many of our best models for exploring nature,
operations are not binary and mentally following even a handful of simultaneous
interactions may be beyond our intuitive capabilities.
Cellular automata
The cases of emergence in nature are many and varied (Camazine et al. 2001;
Coveney 2003). Instead of exhaustively discussing individual cases, I will focus on
one abstraction, the cellular automata model, which can be used to model any case
of pattern formation (Wolfram 1984a, b). Further, the complex behaviour of these
models captures the surprising and mysterious nature of emergence. In short, if we
can understand why we cannot intuitively predict the behaviour of cellular
automata, we will have made progress toward understanding why we lack the ability
to do so for many natural phenomena.
Figure 2 shows several generations of Conway’s game of life (Gardner 1970,
1971; reviewed in Aleksic 2000). The environment of the model is an area divided
into many grid squares. Each square is surrounded by eight other squares. The
squares can be in two states: living or dead (grey or black in the ﬁgure). The rules
for determining whether a site lives or dies between generations are the following:
(1) living sites with two living neighbours remain alive, (2) any site with three living
neighbours either stays alive or is born, and (3) sites either die or remain dead in all
other circumstances. This model has fascinating behaviour. Given a random starting
condition, sometimes all the grids die quickly, sometimes they live but show
random patterns of movement, and sometimes they form geometric shapes that ﬂoat
across the grid. For most initial states, a person is incapable of predicting which of
these possibilities will occur. The spatial and temporal patterns the game of life
produces seem beyond the simplicity of the rules that govern the process. The game
thus displays the surprising character of emergence. Let us now explore this model
from the perspective of our inability to consciously think in parallel.
The key to the problem is to recognize that the computer must acquire a global
property of a focal square’s neighbours before making a decision. The basic
operations, therefore, though simple, require that each cell receive input simulta-
neously from many others. This is necessary, of course, because any of the 8
neighbours of a square can vary from one time to step to the next. Thus, the computer
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theinformationfromseveralbinaryoperationsintooneglobalparameterbeforeusing
that global parameter alone to perform an operation. Of course, in nature there can be
any number of interactants interacting simultaneously and the rules governing their
behaviour can be complex, but, hopefully, it is intuitively clear that the cellular
automata model coarsely simulates a process of multiple simultaneous interactions.
Let us now consider why we perceive cellular automata behaviour as surprising
and unpredictable. First, anyone knowing the rules can look at one cell and easily
predict what it will do at the next time step. The problem for predicting time step 2
is that you would also need to know the state of each of the 8 neighbours at time step
2 and they all will have changed in accordance with the properties of their
neighbours and so on and so on throughout the grid. Hence, the problem requires the
same ability to think in parallel that Fig. 1 demonstrates we do not possess. Of
course, it does not really matter how many neighbours there are any more than it
matters how many lines of 1 and 0s one is asked to add. We cannot think in parallel
at all, so three, eight, or a million simultaneous interactions will all appear equally
bafﬂing.
Fig. 2 Several generations (left to right) of Conway’s game of life. The grids live or die (turn black or
grey) depending on the following rules (1) living sites with two living neighbours remain alive, (2) any
site with three living neighbours either stays alive or is born, and (3) sites either die or remain dead in all
other circumstances. The game is capable of producing complex patterns that seem, to our intuition, far
beyond its simple rules. I argue that we are unable to predict the outcome of such games due to our
inability to consider the behaviour of multiple grids in parallel. If we could accomplish the adding tasks in
Fig. 1, we would not consider the game of life’s behaviour surprising
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Despite a complete knowledge of the rules underlying the interactions between the
parts of many systems we are nevertheless bafﬂed by their sudden transitions from
simple to complex, random to ordered, and ordered to random (Wolfram 2002).
This paper argues that this limitation is a product of the way our minds organize the
complexity of natural interactions into sequences of binary operations. Much of
what we term emergence is, consequently, a subjective product of our intuitive
methods of problem solving and not a characteristic of nature that requires
explanation beyond that explicit in the algorithms we use to generate the behaviour
with computer simulations.
Kant pointed out that because we perceive nature through a ﬁlter (the mind) it
precludesanyobjectiveunderstandingofitsproperties(Russell1945).Scientistshave
largely ignored this problem; and like most scientists, I believe we have done so with
goodreason.Forexample,wecannotdirectlyperceivemicrobesandwhenHookeand
van Leeuwenhoek built the ﬁrst microscopes and notiﬁed us of their existence, the
discoverywasmetwithgreatsurpriseandresistance.BythetimevonFrisch(reviewed
inFrisch1967)informedusthathoneybeesnavigateusingpatterns ofpolarizedlight,
no one was shocked that an invisible wealth of information existed right before our
eyes.Wehadcometothinkofoursensoryequipmentasaproductofourevolutionary
history and not an objective means of perceiving the world. The analogous fact,
however, that our cognitive mechanisms reﬂect an evolutionary history that may
preclude a direct intellectual experience of natural phenomena is not yet widely
appreciated(Crutchﬁeld1994).Inanutshell,wemayﬁndthatweneedtoaugmentour
naturalintellectualabilitieswithhelpfromparallelprocessingcomputers,inmuchthe
same way as we augment our sensory abilities with various gadgets, if we are to both
describe and understand the complexity of nature (Vicsek 2002).
Hopefully, this paper will have impressed upon the reader that understanding the
way our cognitive limitations affect the construction of the logical languages we use
to understand nature should be a major goal of science. As this is already a goal of
many researchers working on similar questions in cognitive science (Pinker 1997;
Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998; Dehaene et al. 1999; Berent et al. 2005) all that
is required is that every branch of science becomes cognizant of these issues.
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